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Abstract: In this thesis, I examine the relationship between corruption and Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) inflows in Brazil. I explore a mechanism which may possibly 
attenuate the effect that corruption has on FDI- circumventing inefficiencies. I 
observe several factors that appear strongly connected to inefficiencies: business 
negotiations, taxation and competition policy. I also find that a prevailing weak legal 
accountability process and small probability of punishment, may help to strengthen 
the attenuating effect. My findings confirm previous studies that determine corruption 
might not necessarily be negatively correlated with FDI.    
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1. Introduction 
Despite being known for its corruption scandals, Brazil has been able to record 
relatively respectable economic growth. Increasing Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
inflows, a growing presence of multinational corporations and even hosting 
international sport events such as the Olympic Games and the Fifa World Cup put 
Brazil into the global focus.  
Brazil is a member of the BRICS and the eighth greatest economy worldwide. Its 
economy, size and population are larger than of any of its neighbouring states. This 
makes Brazil the largest democracy in South America (Green 2012, 40). 
Furthermore, it is Latin America’s largest FDI recipient (Kang and Huang 2012, 474). 
Except for the year 2006, Brazil was constantly in the top 20 FDI recipients worldwide 
since 1995 (The World Bank 2016a). Yet, Brazil has a long history of corruption 
reaching back as far as its colonial days (Green 2012).  
Academics and diplomats have long been discussing the political and economic 
effects of corruption especially in regards to economic growth and FDI. The 
traditional thought is that corruption increases the cost of doing business which has 
negative or hindering effects on the investment climate. Consequently, most scholars 
argue that corruption inhibits FDI. However, I find that this traditional mechanism is 
not fully applicable to the case of Brazil. Investors “just don’t care about the scandal” 
(Sambo and Andrade 2017). Therefore, I suggest that corruption might not be 
negatively correlated to FDI in Brazil, especially in the time between Brazil’s market 
reforms in the early 1990s and the 2014 legal reforms.  
FDI and corruption are topics vastly researched. Nevertheless, there have, to my 
knowledge, only been analyses using econometric frameworks. Analyses looking at 
the effects and influence of corruption in Brazil which followed a more social or 
political science approach have often neglected economic effects. The goal of this 
paper is to connect the different approaches to fill the gap. 
My aim is to explore the mechanisms which may possibly attenuate the effect that 
corruption has on FDI inflows, as seen in the case of Brazil. My argument is that the 
large inefficiencies prevailing in Brazil encourage corrupt behaviour, because bribery 
and other illicit acts allow the circumvention of these inefficiencies. This is possible 
 
 
S1908391  3 
 
because of the weak legal accountability process and the low probability of 
punishment of corrupt behaviour in the private sector.  
This paper is organised into six sections. After the introduction, the second section 
gives a brief overview of the topic. It shows data which casts doubt on the traditional 
assertion that corruption has a negative impact on FDI inflows. I also explain and 
define the key concepts: FDI and corruption. In the third section I review literature 
from which I derive the possible mechanisms how corruption may influence FDI. 
These are part of two competing theories, one which suggests that corruption 
enhances FDI and the other one saying that corruption is a major hindrance. 
Subsequently, I explain the empirical strategy I use based on the suggestion that 
corruption supports FDI because it helps in circumventing inefficiencies. My 
hypothesis is that by circumventing the inefficiencies, the negative effect of corruption 
on FDI may be attenuated.  
In the fourth section I present my empirical findings which are grouped according to 
areas where inefficiencies can be found: doing business, taxation and competition 
policy. I find that there are Brazil specific costs companies have to pay when 
operating in Brazil. These direct and indirect costs for doing business involve 
licencing, obtaining permits, opening a firm and receiving financial support. I find that 
corruption is present in all these cost areas. I explain how corruption may have 
helped companies to waiver the costs and increase the business opportunities. 
Similarly, I find that the costs and bureaucracy existent around taxation portrays 
another obstacle which can be reduced through corruption. Finally, I discuss Brazil’s 
competition policy and find evidence that corruption helped companies in the past to 
secure contracts and hence increase profits. All of these prevailing inefficiencies and 
the impact of illicit behaviour in form of bribes lend credence to my hypothesis that 
inefficiencies may have reduced the effect corruption has on FDI inflows in Brazil. 
This interpretation is corroborated by the finding that the accountability process and 
legal punishment of corruption is weak. The prevailing inefficiencies in the judiciary 
and joint investigatory agencies lower the probability of detection. I argue that the low 
probability to detect corrupt behaviour in the private sector has deteriorated the legal 
enforcement of anti-corruption law. Consequently, deterrence is weak and companies 
might enjoy the benefits gained from corruption to a greater extent. Hence, the effect 
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of corruption may be attenuated. Thus, the findings support the theory that corruption 
may work as a helping hand or “grease in the wheels” for FDI.  
In light of these findings, my fifth section focuses on possible industry variation. I 
select and juxtapose sectors of high, medium and low corruption levels. After giving a 
short overview over the sectors and past corruption cases, I plot their FDI. The 
results demonstrate that there seems to be little difference in FDI levels between the 
industries varying with levels of corruption. Hence, I conclude that my empirical 
findings are plausible and corruption may not be negatively correlated with FDI in 
Brazil. 
2. Institutional background 
The main concepts I use are FDI and corruption. I selected Brazil as a case study 
because it has a long history of corruption and has seen increasing FDI inflows over 
the past two decades. The prevalence of these two factors is especially important, 
since an analysis of the mechanisms would make little or no sense if these 
prerequisites are not met (Beach and Pedersen 2013). 
Figure 1: Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and FDI (BoP) in Brazil (Transparency 
International n.d., The World Bank, 2016) 
Figure 1 presents the prevalence of both corruption perception and FDI inflows 
between 1995 and 2015. However, it does not seem to show any correlation between 
corruption and FDI. This is in contrast to the traditional view that the prevalence of 
corruption deters investors. 
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With a CPI constantly below 50, Brazil can be seen as more corrupt than clean. 
Comparing the years 1995 and 2015 it can be noted, that there has been a decrease 
in corruption perception. Furthermore, it can be seen that the CPI fluctuated to some 
extent between 27 (in 1995) and 43 (in 2012 and 2014) probably due to the 
revelation of various corruption scandals, such as the Mensalão in 2005 and the 
Lava Jato Scandal since 2014. 
Another objection against the traditional view was raised by Jalil, Qureshi, and 
Feridun (2016). In their panel-data study of 42 countries over the period 1984 until 
2012, they found a positive coefficient between corruption and FDI inflows in the 
case of Brazil. This finding suggests that corruption had a positive impact on FDI. 
Their result corroborates that a 1% increase in corruption is associated with a 
1.315% increase in FDI in Brazil. 
FDI measures “the total level of direct investment at a given point in time” (OECD 
2016). They are made “to acquire a lasting management interest (usually 10 percent 
of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in a country other than that of the investor 
(defined according to residency)” (Al-Sadig 2009, 289f). Depending on the economy 
in focus, it is differentiated between inward and outward FDI.  
I only focus on inward FDI, which is defined as “the value of foreign investors' equity 
in and net loans to enterprises resident in the reporting economy” (OECD 2016). 
More specifically, FDI inflows are “the value of inward direct investment made by 
non-resident investors in the reporting economy, including reinvested earnings and 
intra-company loans, net of repatriation of capital and repayment of loans” (United 
Nations 2017). Here, the reporting economy is Brazil. Because I only focus on FDI 
inflows, I will from now on use the terms FDI and inward FDI interchangeably. 
Corruption relates to “the misuse of entrusted authority for personal benefit” (OECD 
2015, 30). Similarly, Transparency International (2016) defines corruption as “the 
abuse of entrusted power for private gain” with the distinct classifications of grand, 
petty and political corruption depending on the sector and amount of money involved. 
Here, the authority is understood as the power given to Brazilian government 
officials. 
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The OECD (2013, 7) enumerates the four most widespread corruption measures: the 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI), the Bribe Payers’ Index (BPI), the Control of 
Corruption Indicator (CC) and the Corruption Index of the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG).  
I use the CPI because it “aggregates data from a number of different sources that 
provide perceptions of business people and country experts of the level of corruption 
in the public sector” (Transparency International 2017). Even though the index only 
accounts the “perception” of corruption, it is still seen as a reliable index due to its 
popularity and the variety of sources used. The index aims to only visualise 
corruption and is therefore “clean of other determinants of the institutional 
environment” (Egger and Winner 2006, 461).  
In order to be able to plot the CPI for the full range of years, I adjusted the range of 
measurement for the years 1995 until 2011. In these years, the CPI was plotted on a 
range between 0 (highly corrupt) and 10 (clean) which was then changed to 0 and 
100 in 2012. Therefore, I multiplied the scores of the years before 2012 by 10 and 
plotted the results on a scale out of a hundred. This is possible because, to my 
knowledge, only the scale but not the method of measurement changed.  
Possible forms of corruptive behaviour are: bribery, influencing trading, 
embezzlement, misappropriation, diversion of property and obstruction of justice 
(OECD 2008), theft and patronage (OECD 2013). This includes inefficiencies such as 
the misallocation of resources and the distortion of incentives (ibid.). Brazil also 
experiences a variation of theft of public money such as embezzlement or tax 
evasion (Taylor 2010). Patronage may appear in form of favouritism, nepotism or 
clientelism (OECD 2013). Especially nepotism seems to be a significant obstacle in 
Brazil, when elected representatives hire family members by using public funds 
(Taylor 2010).  
I mainly focus on bribery because it seems to be the most common and widely used 
form of corruption between country officials and the private sector. Bribery refers to 
influencing public decisions by paying public officials (OECD 2013). However, the 
motives of corruption are likely to be similar and independent of the form used. 
Corruption between two private entities will only be discussed briefly. 
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Bribe payments result from “interaction between public and private interests within 
the structure of state” (Morosini and Vaz Ferreira 2014, 142). Payments involve state 
offers in regards to benefits or costs offered by the state, for instance subsidies 
distribution, tax collection, enforcement of regulations or giving authorisations (ibid.). 
The private sector then tries to bargain to increase the benefits or decrease the costs 
through paying bribes. 
Taylor (2010) argues that the higher the number of public transactions and 
interactions that an organisation is confronted with the more susceptible it is to 
corruption. Taylor’s analysis further shows that Brazilians have more direct 
experience with corruption than their Latin American peers and they view corruption 
as salient hindrance regarding economic development. This is caused by the long 
history of corruption and its persistence in Brazil since colonial days. Hence, it may 
be seen “as a rational (if still unethical) response to local conditions” (Taylor 2010, 
93). In a similar manner, Green (2012) studies the historical development of 
corruption and finds that one of the causes of corruption is the persistent inequality 
because “inequality feeds the growth of more orthodox forms of criminal behavior” 
(ibid., 51) and corrupt modalities have existed independent of the prevailing form of 
government. Green (ibid., 47) further pinpoints that “since the return to democracy in 
1985, every elected government has been caught up in more than one major 
corruption scandal.” 
3. Conceptual framework 
3.1. Theoretical background 
There are well established theories in this field, enumerating various mechanisms. 
My aim is to develop a framework which is suitable for the case. I review relevant 
literature which was published mainly in academic journals and look at the 
mechanisms of how corruption might influence FDI. In the second part of this chapter 
I explain the empirical strategy which I will use for the case of Brazil. The main 
mechanism I find by looking at the theoretical background, is the avoidance of 
inefficiencies. 
Hossain (2016) and Jalil et al (2016) argue that the influence of corruption on FDI 
varies between regions. In general they suggest that corruption has negative effects 
on Latin America’s FDI, with Brazil being an exception (Jalil, Qureshi, and Feridun 
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2016). They consider different economic pull factors for FDI; which are market size, a 
stable macroeconomic environment, the availability of a skilled workforce and 
infrastructure (Hossain 2016, 256). Further determinants of FDI are: corporate tax 
rates, labour cost and quality, trade openness (Hossain 2016), inflation and external 
debt (Jalil, Qureshi, and Feridun 2016) with possible influence from prevalence of 
democracy and bureaucracy (Hossain 2016). I will use some of these determinants in 
my analysis, such as taxation and trade openness, as I found that they play an 
important role and probable motive for corrupt activities. 
There are two groups of theorists with opposing views. One group argues that 
corruption metaphorically greases the economic wheels. The other suggests that 
corruption is a deterrent and hinders FDI which means that it is sand in the wheels of 
the economy. Hence, corruption may be either beneficial for FDI or impeding it. Some 
authors refer to the sand or grease in the wheels theory as the grabbing or helping 
hand (Amarandei 2013; Egger and Winner 2006). Building on the findings of Jalil et 
al (2016) that corruption did not have a negative impact on FDI in Brazil, I focus on 
the greasing-the-wheels theory. However, as the norm supported by most OECD 
states is mitigating corruption, the OECD and other international organisations 
support the “sand-in-the-wheels” theory and conclude that corruption has myriad 
disadvantages for FDI (OECD 2013). One exception is the “Asian Paradox” where 
some Asian countries show high corruption levels and high economic growth rates 
(ibid.).  
Mechanisms Literature 
Avoiding inefficiencies 
(Jalil, Qureshi, and Feridun 2016, 
259) 
Circumventing bureaucracy 
(Delgado, McCloud, and Kumbhakar 
2014, 300) 
Circumventing government regulations (OECD 2013, 3) 
Facilitating transactions (Hossain 2016, 257) 
Speeding up processes (Bellos and Subasat 2012, 565f) 
Table 1: Mechanisms suggested by the “greasing the wheels” theory 
 
Table 1 shows the mechanisms how corruption is thought to grease the investment 
environment. These can be summarised under the idea of avoiding or circumventing 
inefficiencies. Scholars argue, that in countries with high, inefficient bureaucracies 
and burdensome government regulations, corruption can help to bypass these 
(Delgado, McCloud, and Kumbhakar 2014; OECD 2013; Bellos and Subasat 2012). 
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Furthermore, transactions between companies or with the state can be facilitated 
(Hossain 2016). Hence, corruption may accelerate and facilitate processes which can 
be translated into a reduction of indirect costs especially in terms of time.  
Corruption may further help to reduce the direct costs of doing business through 
bribing government officials to ease inspections. As a result firms may pay less in 
taxes or tariffs which might be essential if the company wants to stay in business 
(Taylor 2010). Similarly, facilitating transactions can also ease the market entrance of 
foreign firms as it could help circumventing for instance environmental regulations or 
reducing entrance barriers. As a result, conducting business seems easier compared 
to less corrupt countries.  
Bribe payments may also be used to win private or public tenders and thus business. 
Hence, the bribing company can achieve more contracts which are likely to translate 
into higher profits and an increased market share. An environment of bribe-paying 
competitors is likely to motivate a company to engage in corruption to win business 
(Taylor 2010). Based on a cost-benefit analysis, companies may find that the bribe 
payment only represents a small cost in relation to the potential gains they achieve in 
return (ibid.). The illicit payments are also likely to be smaller than the direct or 
indirect cost they would have to pay otherwise. If the benefits of paying the bribe are 
higher than the potential costs, illicit behaviour is expected to be more accepted by 
the majority of companies. 
On the other hand, there are various mechanisms scholars suggest which may lead 
to corruption inhibiting FDI inflows (Table 2). Those scholars generally agree that 
corruption increases the cost of production and consequently decreases profits 
(OECD 2013; Al-Sadig 2009; Amarandei 2013; Bellos and Subasat 2012; Egger and 
Winner 2006; Habib and Zurawicki 2002; Hossain 2016; Jalil, Qureshi, and Feridun 
2016).   
Corruption may lead to a reduction in investment quality and deteriorates 
infrastructure (Jalil, Qureshi, and Feridun 2016). The quality of investments is 
particularly damaged because resources are not used efficiently (ibid.). Corruption is 
further expected to divert or hinder the free flow of resources (Delgado, McCloud, 
and Kumbhakar 2014). Hence, the efficient allocation provided by free markets 
cannot prevail. This often leads to uneven competition (Bellos and Subasat 2012; 
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Habib and Zurawicki 2002). Inefficient resource allocation may further hinder 
innovation (Delgado, McCloud, and Kumbhakar 2014). These factors then lead to a 
decrease in a country’s productivity (Jalil, Qureshi, and Feridun 2016).  
Mechanisms Literature 
Decreasing investment quality (Jalil, Qureshi, and Feridun 2016, 261) 
Decreasing productivity (Jalil, Qureshi, and Feridun 2016, 261) 
Decreasing transparency 
(Jalil, Qureshi, and Feridun 2016, 259ff) 
(Bellos and Subasat 2012, 565) 
Deteriorating infrastructure (Jalil, Qureshi, and Feridun 2016, 261) 
Hindering innovation 
(Delgado, McCloud, and Kumbhakar 
2014, 299) 
Increasing costs 
(OECD 2013, 3) 
(Al-Sadig 2009, 267) 
(Amarandei 2013, 314) 
(Bellos and Subasat 2012, 565) 
(Egger and Winner 2006, 459) 
(Habib and Zurawicki 2002, 293) 
(Hossain 2016, 257) 
(Jalil, Qureshi, and Feridun 2016, 259ff) 
Increasing risk (Habib and Zurawicki 2002, 303) 
Increasing uncertainty 
(Bellos and Subasat 2012, 565) 
(OECD 2013, 3) 
(Al-Sadig 2009, 269) 
Less legal protection 
(Bellos and Subasat 2012, 565) 
(Jalil, Qureshi, and Feridun 2016, 259) 
Resources (Hindering free flow, 
inefficient use) 
(Delgado, McCloud, and Kumbhakar 
2014, 298f) 
(Jalil, Qureshi, and Feridun 2016, 259) 
Uneven competition 
(Bellos and Subasat 2012, 565) 
(Habib and Zurawicki 2002, 293) 
Table 2: Mechanisms suggested by the “sand in the wheels” theory 
 
From a legal perspective illicit behaviour may increase uncertainty (Bellos and 
Subasat 2012; OECD 2013; Al-Sadig 2009) for instance because agreements 
emerging from corruption might not be legally binding. Hence, there is often no or 
only little legal protection for the contracting parties (Bellos and Subasat 2012; Jalil, 
Qureshi, and Feridun 2016). A lack of legal protection could lead to higher risks of 
breached contracts (Habib and Zurawicki 2002). Thus, uncertainty and risks increase 
which could become costly for firms and lead to less predictability. The limitation or 
lack of transparency (Jalil, Qureshi, and Feridun 2016; Bellos and Subasat 2012) 
might also increase uncertainties which investors may not be willing to face. 
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Consequently, corruption could deter corporations to invest into certain countries or 
markets. 
The probability that the corrupt activity gets detected and successfully punished also 
plays an important role (Taylor 2010). A high probability is likely to lead to additional 
direct and indirect costs as well as damaging a company’s reputation. Hence, it is 
likely to act as a deterrent and may hinder companies profiting from the benefits 
corruption might have. Hossain (2016, 268) summarises that reducing corruption 
would increase the FDI inflows due to increased confidence of investors, a reduction 
of costs and higher transparency and accountability. However, the general 
perception is that the relative importance or impact of both sides, the sand and the 
grease mechanisms as well as the probability of punishment influence or outweigh 
each other.  
Therefore, it needs to be taken into account that the effects of corruption depend on 
the overall structure of the economy and regulations. “If the revenue effects outweigh 
the cost effects, corruption is expected to increase FDI” (Amarandei 2013, 314) and 
vice-versa. Consequently, the overall impact of corruption can be either negative, 
positive, or zero, depending on the importance of both aspects or which mechanism 
is dominant (Egger and Winner 2006, 459). In the case of Brazil I assume that 
corruption does not have a strong negative impact on FDI. According to Amarandei’s 
theory of balancing this would mean that the benefits achieved through corruption are 
higher or equal compared to the respective disadvantages. 
3.2. Empirical strategy 
The aim of this thesis is to analyse the mechanisms that might have attenuated the 
effect that corruption has on FDI. I will use the established, aforementioned theory by 
emphasising the greasing-the-wheels effect. I focus on this theory because as seen 
in the previous sections, corruption might not have a negative correlation with FDI. 
Consequently, the sand-in-the-wheels theory does not seem to be completely 
applicable to the case. This was for instance shown by Jalil et al (2016) who 
calculated that a 1% increase in corruption would lead to a 1.315% increase in FDI. 
Subsequently, the underlying purpose of the thesis is “to investigate whether the 
hypothesized mechanism was present in the case” (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 165). 
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Here, the mechanism in focus is that corruption circumvents inefficiencies and may 
therefore attenuate the effect of corruption on FDI.  
First of all, I conceptualise the theory and establish the framework which I employ 
during the empirical research. A framework is important in order to analyse the 
process. Here, the mechanisms need to be “disaggregated into a series of parts 
composed of entities engaging in activities” (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 164). The 
entities used are international corporations engaging in corrupt activities. The 
mechanisms and hence the theoretical underlying forces are taken from the theory. 
The reviewed process looks at the ways corruption may attenuate the effect of 
corruption on FDI. Thus, the expected outcome is either no visible change or a slight 
increase in FDI. In focus for the theoretical framework are inefficiencies and the 
possibility of circumvention through corruption. 
Taylor (2010, 95) asserts that “corruption emerges from a mix of long-term structural 
conditions and institutional factors that constitute the environment in which corrupt 
activity takes place”. I argue, in line with the theory that the conditions mainly refer to 
inefficiencies. Thus, the following hypothesis will be tested: There are prevailing 
inefficiencies in Brazil which can be avoided through corrupt activities. Hence, 
prevailing inefficiencies are the principle aspect of the theory which is singled out for 
analysis.  
Included in the inefficiency analysis will be costs since they are a central argument of 
the opponents of the greasing-the-wheel theory. They argue that corruption 
increases the costs of doing business in a country and is therefore impeding FDI. 
Furthermore, costs are a vital part when operating in Brazil. The country has the 
reputation of being a “highly bureaucratized society or inefficient system” (Green 
2012, 45). Here, a great obstacle is the “Custo Brasil” (Brazil Cost), a popular phrase 
used in literature to summarise Brazil specific costs which companies need to pay for 
doing business.  
The OECD (2015, 27) summarises Brazil costs as “the high costs of Brazil’s industry 
as a result of weak policy settings”. The overall burden of these costs caused by 
government regulations is among the highest in global comparison and bribe 
payments are quite common (World Economic Forum 2015, OECD 2015b). It 
includes both direct and indirect costs of business operations arising from 
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“distribution, government procedures, employee benefits, environmental laws, and a 
complex tax structure” (U.S. Department of Commerce 2016b). In summary, these 
costs include obstacles arising from the complex bureaucracy of the tax system and 
other administrative or regulatory frameworks and judicial hurdles (International 
Monetary Fund 2015). Despite not being explicitly stated, corruption is sometimes 
also assigned to this category. The importance of the Brazil Costs as summary of the 
inefficiencies makes it a central part for my empirical analysis.  
By providing these stumbling blocks for foreign and local investors, the Brazil Costs 
are a major obstacle inhibiting economic growth and investment (International 
Monetary Fund 2015). It is suggested that reasons for the poor domestic services 
provided mainly allude to a variety of interconnected factors such as the quality of 
infrastructure, costs of doing business, openness to trade and consequently access 
to new technologies and innovation and the efficiency especially in the financial 
sector (The World Bank 2016b). In the case of Brazil, the obstacles are in particular, 
“burdensome taxes, inefficient regulation, poor access to long-term financing, and a 
rigid labor market” (The Heritage Foundation 2017). All these hindrances depict 
inefficiencies and raise costs. In order to structure the empirical analysis, I group 
these factors as follows: doing business, taxation and competition policy. These three 
groups are used for the framework of my empirical analysis as depicted below.  
 
Apart from the inefficiencies prevailing in Brazil I give industry examples, where 
possible, of situations when corruption was used. Statistics are explained where 
available to support my findings. In my research I use mainly qualitative, secondary 
data from a variety of sources as for example analyses by international organisations, 
academic articles and newspaper articles. Nevertheless, the prohibition of corruption 
makes it difficult to find myriads of reliable sources and examples from previous 
years on why a company used bribe payments. Therefore, the majority of examples 
include revelations of current investigations mainly concerning the Lava Jato 
Prevailance of 
Corruption 
helps circumvening 
inefficiencies 
•doing business 
• taxation 
•competition policy 
Effect of corruption 
on FDI is attenuated 
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Scandal. Throughout the course of the proceedings, various business people and 
politicians have testified and explained the corrupt networks, strategies and reasons 
for using these means. Because the revelations mainly refer to the last decade, I 
argue that they are applicable to this case study. Furthermore, the oil and connected 
construction industry which are in focus of the investigators are major recipients of 
FDI. Especially the petroleum conglomerate Petrobras, which is “the one true magnet 
that’s attracting all of that foreign capital flowing into Brazil” (Rapoza 2012). Its 
importance for Brazil and the industry make it an interesting and useful example for 
the case. 
Furthermore, it is important to compare the costs of corruption to the profits 
generated with its aid. There are some developments I expect, which could have 
influenced the outcome. I assume that in terms of business operations, bribing 
government officials led to the award of contracts. Bribes may have also led to 
reductions of costs for instance in taxation. Thus, as argued by supporters of the 
greasing-the-wheels theory, the bribe payment may only have been a minor cost in 
order to generate higher profits which would possibly not have been achieved without 
the payment. 
Theory recalls that corruption reduces the effective resource allocation for example 
through hindering their free flow or creating artificial bottlenecks. The ineffective use 
of resources would then reduce productivity and hence FDI inflows. The resource 
allocation may have not at all, or only slightly been affected by corruption, but rather 
by other inefficiencies in the market environment. Another possibility is that the 
diversion of resources did not negatively influence companies. 
Scholars argue that corruption further reduces or distorts competition in the market, 
for instance when artificial monopolies or oligopolies are created. Limited competition 
would then reduce productivity and FDI inflows. I expect that competition is reduced 
due to other circumstances such as inefficient liberalisation of the market. Therefore, 
corruption might not have limited competition in the Brazilian market.  
Apart from analysing the inefficiencies, I will look at the enforcement of anti-
corruption law and the probability of detection. I argue that a weak or inefficient 
judiciary is advantageous for corruption because the probability to get caught would 
be low. Thus, the factor of deterrence might not be given. Analysing the judiciary is 
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likely to help assessing the quality of law-enforcement. I expect that the 
accountability process and anti-corruption law-enforcement is weak which could thus 
not successfully deter bribery. Because of its importance and complexity, legal 
enforcement forms a separate part in the empirical analysis. 
Lastly, to find further evidence on whether the empirical findings may be true, I look 
at industry variation. The aim is to identify the differences in FDI between industries 
of high, medium and low corruption. I do this by identifying sectors with these criteria 
and analysing their respective FDIs. Statistics and surveys mainly from secondary 
sources are used to differentiate the level of corruption. If the hypothesis is true that 
corruption may attenuate the effect of corruption on FDI, the FDIs of high and low 
corrupt industries should show similar developments. 
4. Empirical findings 
4.1. Doing business 
Bribe payments might assist the importation process in a multitude of ways. They 
could accelerate the time to clear imports from customs, reduce tariffs or ease 
inspections. Consequently, direct and indirect costs may be reduced. This is 
especially important because companies operating in Brazil face a large complexity 
of regulations which often lead to large financial burdens. The bureaucratic obstacles 
are not only time consuming but also create relatively high compliance costs. The 
OECD (2015b, 51) argues that while direct compliance costs are comparable to 
neighbouring or OECD countries, the indirect costs resulting from numerous and time 
consuming procedures are higher.  
Business operations are complex and include myriad bureaucratic processes for 
instance, when opening a new business, importing or applying for licenses. Apart 
from these administrative processes, companies face a variety of other obstacles 
such as regular audits and application for financial support. My research shows that 
all these activities are affected by corruption with the aim to facilitate processes and 
to avoid costs. 
Research confirms, that bribes are frequently used as a catalyst to accelerate 
bureaucracy and the transmission of documents (Salgado 2002). Over a third of the 
population feels that business is corrupt (Transparency International 2013). 11.7% of 
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1,802 firms surveyed by the World Bank corroborate that they had previously been 
asked to pay bribes during their business operations (World Bank Group 2009). This 
is not surprising because almost half of the Brazilian population agrees that public 
officials and civil servants are corrupt (Transparency International 2013). 
In terms of opening new businesses, firms evaluate the process as medium efficient 
and cumbersome, principally due to the high level of bureaucracy, cost and the 
required time (The Heritage Foundation 2017). Despite the existence of free trade 
agreements, trade barriers and tariff protection are high and raise the costs and 
product prices especially for high capital and intermediate goods (OECD 2015b). 
With 10%, Brazil’s average tariff is higher than in other countries of the region such 
as Colombia (OECD 2015, 30).  
Furthermore, non-tariff barriers such as customs are medium high in global 
comparison (Brazil ranks 117 of 140). Custom procedures and compliance portray 
high burdens as shown by the low ranking in the Global Competitiveness Index 
where Brazil only ranks 133 out of 140 (World Economic Forum 2015). Businesses 
are also highly impacted by the rules on FDI (rank 108 of 140). Clearing for instance 
imports from customs required 24.7 days which is around 10 days more than in other 
Latin American countries (World Bank Group 2009). Thus, almost 30% of firms 
identify customs and trade regulations as a major obstacle in Brazil which lies above 
the regional average of 18.2% (ibid.). 
Lengthy processes and additional costs also challenge the application for licenses 
and permits. Corruption may reduce the time and money needed to obtain a license. 
It might also ease controls and inspections and subsequently decisions in favour of 
issuance. For companies, this is especially important because opening a firm in 
Brazil is often considered challenging. At 83 days, opening a business takes over 7 
times longer than in other Latin American countries (OECD 2015, 29) and three times 
longer than in countries like China (The World Bank 2016b). This is due to the high 
regulatory and tax burdens which are among the highest in global comparison (The 
World Bank 2016b). The process comprises 12 procedures and is therefore 
bureaucratic and burdensome which the Brazilian government has already 
acknowledged (OECD 2015, World Economic Forum 2015). 
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In 2002 Transparência Brasil and the consulting firm Kroll conducted a survey among 
92 firms, discussing corruption in the private sector (Globonews 2002). The study 
revealed that the majority of firms have been confronted with bribe payments by 
government officials in the past in return for the permission for participation in public 
bidding processes or to obtain licences. Almost half of the companies (48.4%) 
identify licensing and permits as a major constraint to business operations in Brazil. 
This is more than twice as many as the regional average (World Bank Group 2009). 
The time required to collect licenses is relatively lengthy: 79.7 days for an operating 
license and 73.2 days for a construction-related permit (World Bank Group 2009). 
The regional average is as low as 45.1 days to obtain an operating license. However, 
the process to get a construction-related permit is faster than the regional average 
time of 84.8 days (ibid.). As I explain in the following sections, the construction 
industry is affected vastly by corruption. Therefore, it may be that the high corruption 
accelerated the average time needed for obtaining a construction license. 
The average time for issuing an import license is 62.6 days (World Bank Group 
2009). This exceeds the statutory timeframe of 60 days (World Trade Organization 
2013, 10) and is more than twice as long as the regional average of 25.5 days (World 
Bank Group 2009). Reasons may be a lack in capacity of the customs services and 
high bureaucratic burden which inhibits faster processing. In some cases, goods 
require licenses from more than one agency or even a fee (World Trade Organization 
2013, 10) which prolongs the processes even more.  
A study by the World Bank Group (2009) confirms the prevalence of corruption in the 
licensing environment. 9.9 % of the firms surveyed were expected to use bribes in 
order to get an operating licence which is almost the same number as for 
construction permits (9.4%). However, in terms of import licenses corruption only 
affected 1.2% of firms. Apart from licencing, gifts were requested in exchange for 
electrical connections (4.6% of firms), water connections (6.7%) or simply “to get 
things done” (12.5%) (ibid.). 
Illicit means may also be used in order to obtain financial assistance or other 
incentives, for example in the form of financial support, tax incentives, credit 
insurance or guarantees (World Trade Organization 2013, 11). These incentives are 
available at federal and local levels, for example for programmes in the automotive, 
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information technology or petroleum sector (ibid.). According to the Global 
Competitive Index, financial services are available and relatively affordable (World 
Economic Forum 2015). However, it is difficult to access these loans or to gain 
venture capital (ibid.). The availability of subsidised credits is either scarce or costly 
due to their accessibility and high interest rates (OECD 2015b, 19). These restrict 
firms new to the Brazilian market. The often urgently needed financial assistance 
imposes large obstacles for the firms. Credits at low interest rates are almost 
exclusively available from the Brazilian national development bank (BNDES1). In 
some cases, small and medium sized enterprises cannot afford the loans offered by 
private banks as they often come with high interest rates. Consequently, corruption 
can work as a facilitator to gain access to cheap loans. Nevertheless, small firms may 
not have the means to pay for, or organise large bribes. 
The World Bank (2016) found that often older, more conservative companies, and not 
firms with different profiles, benefited from public loans with low interest rates. 
Therefore, it was little surprising when corruption investigations began around the 
BNDES. In 2010, the dispersed loans of the BNDES comprised a value of around 
$101 billion (Margolis 2016). It is estimated that around 60% of loans provided by the 
BNDES between 2003 and 2011 went to companies with high annual earnings 
instead of those companies originally envisaged for the subsidised, affordable loans 
(ibid.). By providing financial support, for example to political candidates during 
electoral campaigns, companies attained $28 million worth of loans in return if the 
candidate won (ibid.). In the case of loosing, loans to the company dropped 
significantly (ibid.). Marcelo Odebrecht, imprisoned former head of the construction 
conglomerate Odebrecht, has revealed that the former Brazilian finance minister 
pressured him to financially support political campaigns in exchange for cheap, 
subsidised loans (ibid.).  
Nevertheless, the scandal evolving around the BNDES was not the first of its kind. 
Around the turn of the millenium, two large development agencies were already 
found guilty in diverting funds. Instead of promoting economic development by 
providing financial assistance, the agencies enriched businessmen and politicians 
(Green 2012, 48). For those companies with sufficient funds for corruption, these 
bribes brought cheap capital. On the other hand, those dependent on initial financial 
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aid, are unlikely to profit from credit related bribes if they do not successfully bribe 
agents themselves. 
Corruption and bribe payments also appear on a less structured and smaller scale. 
Research confirmed that bribe payments enabled firms to benefit from more relaxed 
inspections by ending threats, ignoring fraud, fines and undeclared values 
(Globonews 2002). Hence, even occasional, small bribe payments are already likely 
to lead to cost reductions, facilitating business operations or the release from 
charges. Subsequently, apart from circumventing inefficiencies, corruption also 
helped reduce direct and indirect costs of doing business.  
4.2. Taxation 
The Global Competitiveness Report shows that tax rates are the primary hurdle of 
doing business in Brazil (World Economic Forum 2015) and subsequently cause of 
inefficiencies. A survey conducted by the World Bank Group (2009) found that 71.4% 
of firms see tax administration in general as a major constraint. Tax rates are 
considered as a major  hurdle by 81.5% of the firms. Both shares are vastly above 
the regional average where only 20.9% see tax administration and 32.9% of firms 
find tax rates constraining (ibid.).  
Traditionally taxation has been a popular subject affected by corruption. Reasons for 
corruption are, according to Pearson (2016) the high tax rates as well as the complex 
and burdensome tax system. These make tax evasion a “survival strategy” (Taylor 
2010, 93). Corruption might also accelerate the tax compliance time. 
Companies have confirmed the existence of corruption in relation to taxation. 8.3% of 
the firms surveyed had already been asked by  tax officials to pay bribes or give 
presents (World Bank Group 2009). What is more interesting is that more foreign 
(13.7%) than domestic companies (4.2%) had been asked for bribes (ibid.). These 
findings reveal the high perception of taxation related hindrances for business 
operations in Brazil. They further confirm, that corruption is rooted in this sector. In 
the following, I identify the inefficiencies in more detail. 
The total tax rate in Brazil is 69,0% of profits (World Economic Forum 2015). This is 
significantly above the regional average of 52.3% (World Bank Group and Pwc 2017, 
122). The non-refundable taxes alone account for an increase of around 6% of final 
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investment costs (Confederação Nacional da Indústria 2014, 11f). Total taxation 
costs represent around 14.8% of the total investmet value (ibid., 21). However, with 
only ten required payments the number is less than half of the amount of payments 
usually required in South America (World Bank Group and Pwc 2017, 123).  
Not only are the direct taxation costs a burden, especially in terms of compliance, the 
indirect costs related to taxation are relatively high in global comparison (OECD 
2015b). This is due to a “fragmented and inefficient indirect tax system” (OECD 2015, 
27). Curiously, taxation systems vary between states and sometimes even 
municipalities, for instance in terms of the value added taxes (VAT) (OECD 2015b; 
Confederação Nacional da Indústria 2014). These local variations demonstrate a 
barrier to investment which is higher in Brazil than in its neighbouring countries due 
to the regulations and local differences (Subramanian, Anderson, and Lee 2005). 
There are three levels of government for which different regulations and tax rates 
may apply: state, province and municipality. There is also not a single, common VAT 
but a variety of at least four distinct tax rates depending on the kind of good or 
service concerned (Confederação Nacional da Indústria 2014). Internal taxes vary 
and depend on the “product type, the competent sub-federal authority, and the 
importer’s tax regime status” (World Trade Organization 2013). Hence, compliance 
with this complex system is difficult and time consuming. Furthermore, requesting a 
tax refund is also time consuming and is related to relatively high bureaucracy 
(Confederação Nacional da Indústria 2014). 
Even though the time to comply with tax payments has decreased in Brazil, it is still a 
major obstacle. The introduction of electronic systems increased the efficiency within 
the tax compliance process (World Bank Group and Pwc 2017). Brazil managed to 
save 562 hours in tax compliance in 2015 compared to previous years. However, 
with 2,038 hours in 2015, Brazil still has the highest time to comply with taxes 
worldwide according to a study conducted by the World Bank Group (ibid., 38). The 
regional average of time to comply with taxes is 564 hours and thus less than a third 
of the time requirement in Brazil (ibid., 122). 
Recent revelations in relation to the “Operation Zelotes” which started in 2014 found 
a number of tax evasion cases involving over 70 Brazilian companies. These 
companies are from a variety of industries, for example agricultre, civil engineering 
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and finance (Boadle 2015). By bribing officials these companies achieved a reduction 
or waiver of the required tax payments (Pearson 2016). Hence, bribe payments 
allowed companies to save time and money which may have helped some firms to 
change losses into profits. Waivers may have also accelerated the business 
processes because no or less compliance time was required. 
Furthermore, corruption often involves the Brazilian VAT called ICMS2 (Salgado 
2002). By bribing government officials to ease inspections, companies only pay an 
inferior value in taxes and a commission to the inspector. A case in the state of Mato 
Grosso in the end of the 1990s showed that by paying 10% of the initial ICMS value 
in bribes, the inspectors let goods enter the state without the required tax payments 
(Salgado 2002). Thus, the companies saved 90% of the tax payment which 
significantly reduced the costs of doing business.  
4.3. Competition policy 
Competitive pressures and resource allocation mechanisms are weak and do not 
necessarily favour those firms with high productivity as in a free market (OECD 
2015). These weak competitive pressures, the lack of incentives and high trade 
protection hinder productivity gains (ibid.). Researchers found that Brazil has more 
poorly-managed companies than for example Mexico, China or the USA (The World 
Bank 2016b). This is partly caused by the insufficient competition and thus lagging 
incentive to increase productivity. In global comparison the intensity of local 
competition is rated medium with relatively ineffective anti-monopoly policy (World 
Economic Forum 2015). 
Bribes are often aimed at influencing or avoiding extensive competition. Latest 
revelations indicate to what extent corruption is used to influence the market. Emílio 
Odebrecht, former chairmen of the construction firm Odebrecht, one of the main 
companies involved in the Lava Jato corruption scandal, revealed that bribes have 
helped the company to increase its turnover from R$17bn in 2003 to R$132bn in 
2015 (Chade 2017). In Brazil itself, Odebrecht gained $1.9 billion in contracts in 
return for only $349 million spent in bribes (Stevenson and Sreeharsha 2016; U.S. 
District Court 2016, 12). For over a decade, the company bribed government officials 
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and employees of Petrobras in order to illegally secure contracts in multiple countries 
(U.S. District Court 2016). 
In general, researchers found that at least 32.9% of companies are expected to give 
presents or to pay bribes in order to secure government contracts (World Bank Group 
2009). However, the share of foreign-owned firms is lower (3.7%). The additional 
costs for the bribe payments accounted on average for 0.4% of the contract value 
(ibid.). Companies are likely to reimburse these costs by adding them to the sales 
price. Subsequently, companies could gain from the additional contract value while 
reimbursing the costs of corruption.  
Some argue that corruption restricts competition and therefore creates inefficiencies. 
While this may be true for some cases, I find that some restrictions to competitive 
forces are leftovers of previous governments. Until the late 1980s Brazil’s economy 
and policy making supported various competition-limiting and resource-diverting 
factors. These included high protection and isolation of the Brazilian market from 
global competition and an evolving monopolistic or oligopolistic market structure with 
rent-seeking firms and little orientation towards improvements in productivity (Amann 
and Baer 2008). Only in the 1990s, Brazil started liberalising its market and 
privatising its firms. The effect and degree of liberalisation still varies between 
industries and not all sectors of the economy were able to increase productivity and 
to successfully deal with the new competitive pressures (ibid.). This is one of the 
reasons why restrictions in foreign investment and therefore competitive distortion 
are still present in a variety of sectors such as, “health, mass media, and 
telecommunications, aerospace industry, rural property, maritime and air transport” 
(World Trade Organization 2013, 9). Evidence may be that less productive 
companies often gain the largest market shares (OECD 2015, 29). This shows that 
inefficiencies also have other origins than corruption. 
Traditionally, bribe payments also motivated country officials to influence the market 
and competition. The latest corruption investigations revealed that the chemical 
company Braskem paid over $20 million in bribes to government officials (Stevenson 
and Sreeharsha 2016). In return, these influenced the petroleum supplier Petrobras 
to sell their crude oil byproducts for more favourable prices (ibid.). Further bribe 
payments made by Braskem to politicans influenced policy making in passing a law 
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which allows tax credit for certain raw materials purchased by Braskem (ibid.). 
Hence, Braskem managed to decrease its cost of production and may have benefited 
from a facilitated taxation system. 
Despite these bribe payments helping companies like Braskem, it needs to be taken 
into account, that they may drive other companies out of the market. Thus, bribe 
payments can be useful for those paying them but due to the distortion of 
competition, other companies, especially those of small or medium size, are likely to 
be disadvantaged. Therefore, corruption may be beneficial but could also deter some 
companies, according to the sand-in-the-wheels theorists.  
Furthermore, those companies profiting need to take into account that the contracts 
are not necessarily legally binding. Therefore, in case of disputes, the parties may 
have difficulties to legally enforce the meeting of commitments. In addition, 
transparency especially towards the shareholders is not given. Construction 
companies can for instance raise their prices or charge for additional services initially 
not agreed upon and the client has little possibility to demand adherence to the 
contract. However, this is seldom an issue from the foreign investor’s point of view as 
long as profits are generated. 
As the Lava Jato operation shows, Braskem is not the only company profiting from 
illicit behaviour. In order to participate in a transportation project, Odebrecht paid over 
$20 million between 2010 and 2014 to government officials which led to profits of 
around $184 million (U.S. District Court 2016, 15). For another construction project 
located in Rio de Janeiro, Odebrecht paid around $9.7 million in bribes over the 
course of 4 years which led to profits of around $142 million (ibid., 16). These 
examples prove that corruption does not necessarily increase the costs for the 
company on the bribing end. In the aforementioned cases the costs only represented 
a small share compared to the gains achieved. 
Another strategy pursued by companies through illicit means is the formation of 
cartel-like networks. Odebrecht and other construction companies, for instance, 
formed such a network as recent revelations showed. The firms divided up contracts 
and coordinated prices. Consequently, various companies achieved contracts and 
similarly to oligopolies, they could charge higher prices for their services. 
 
 
S1908391  24 
 
Investigations conducted by an U.S. District Court (2016, 13) have found and 
published the procedure used by these companies:  
“Once it was determined which company or companies should be responsible 
for a certain project, as well as the price that Petrobras felt was appropriate for 
the particular project, it was agreed that only the predetermined company 
would present a qualifying bid, and that the other Cartel Companies would 
present proposals that would ensure the predetermined company's winning 
bid. In this manner, the Cartel Companies rotated the available Petrobras 
contracts between them.” 
The previous examples show that in terms of competitiveness, corruption allowed 
some companies to achieve profits and survive in the market. This contradicts the 
idea of corruption deterring investment. On the other hand, Brazil also faces a variety 
of structural shortcomings which may instead influence its competitiveness. I argue 
that these need to be understood as obstacles for investment instead of solely 
focusing on the prevalence of corruption. These hindrances are for example 
“inadequate infrastructure, insufficient access to credit, and high taxes” (World Trade 
Organization 2013, 8) as well as the previously mentioned administrative burden and 
regulations (OECD 2015b; International Monetary Fund 2015). Competitiveness is 
also reduced due to trade barriers, local content requirements and high tariffs which 
shield Brazil from competition. Other barriers are the low quality of education and skill 
level of the workforce (OECD 2015), low innovation, lack of quality infrastructure and 
to some extent inefficient governance and justice (International Monetary Fund 
2015).  
Probably the most severe factor is the lack of physical infrastructure. This is one of 
the main constraints for the Brazilian economy (International Monetary Fund 2015) 
together with the capital market scarcity (OECD 2015b). Almost 28% of the firms 
consider transportation as a major constraint (World Bank Group 2009). In global 
comparision it shows that Brazil’s infrastructure quality is relatively low (World 
Economic Forum 2015). Companies operating in Brazil face high transport and 
logistics costs (OECD 2015). In addition to these direct costs, insufficient logistics 
cause for instance delays and thus indirect costs (Subramanian, Anderson, and Lee 
2005).  
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The Global Competitive Index shows that the overall education system as well as 
primary education is low, ranking Brazil 132nd out of 140 observed economies 
(World Economic Forum 2015). Education is seen as one of the most important 
development priorities in Brazil according to the 2016 Country Opinion Survey (The 
World Bank Group 2016). The poor education system also negatively affects the 
quality of the workforce which is another inhibiting factor. 74.9% of the surveyed 
companies say that the workforce in Brazil is inadequately educated (World Bank 
Group 2009). This is more than twice as many as in the regional comparison.  
Furthermore, companies operating in Brazil face complex and rigid labour regulation 
(OECD 2015b). These impose additional direct and indirect costs on companies. 
Labour costs have increased over the last years due to minimum wage indexation, 
taxes and a consumption orientated policy (ibid., 20). The restrictive labour 
regulations are the second most problematic factor for business operations in Brazil 
(World Economic Forum 2015). Labour regulations are seen as outmoded with high 
non-salary costs of employment (The Heritage Foundation 2017). This is the reason 
why labour regulations are seen as a major constraint by 63.2% of Brazilian firms 
whereas the regional average is only 16% (World Bank Group 2009). Based on these 
previous examples it is important to see that there are also non-corruption related 
inefficiencies which influence market attractiveness. 
4.4. Legal enforcement 
Corruption is more likely to be effective and offer the aforementioned advantages if it 
is not detected. A high probability of detection and punishment may outweigh the 
possible benefits. Thus, the quality of law enforcement is highly important. I argue 
that the accountability process, the law enforcement efficiency and the probability of 
conviction were low in Brazil and therefore an insufficient deterrent of corruption. 
Only the 2014 reforms may change this perception. 
Despite having a relatively strong legal framework (Green 2012), the application of 
the law is considered weak (Taylor and Buranelli 2007). The judiciary is considered 
the least efficient government institution in Brazil and it is the only one responsible for 
legal punishment (Mota Prado, Carson, and Correa 2015, 107). Consequently, the 
judiciary represents a bottleneck of Brazil’s anti-corruption system (ibid., 113). 
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The Index of Economic Freedom calculated by the Heritage Foundation (2017), a 
Washington based think tank, summarises that, “the efficiency and overall quality of 
government services remain poor”. The poor services arising from government 
inefficiency and the lack of capacity do not only affect corporations but are also major 
obstacles for the work and efforts of the World Bank (World Bank Group 2016). The 
judiciary is one government branch providing low service quality. 
Especially the private sector has received little attention from law enforcement as it 
was mainly ignored by Brazilian anti-corruption law (Morosini and Vaz Ferreira 2014). 
The focus was primarily on the involvement of the public administration which 
relegated the private sector to the background (Taffarello 2015). The legal framework 
drafted by anti-corruption law was insufficient in preventing or punishing corrupt 
companies (Morosini and Vaz Ferreira 2014). Only the legal changes in 2014 and the 
implementation of the Brazilian Clean Company Act show a stricter accountability 
process towards bribery in the private sector (ibid.). The new anti-corruption laws 
“dramatically altered the enforcement landscape in Brazil” (Girgenti, 2016).  
Even though anti-corruption law may exist on paper, it does not necessarily mean 
that the process of enforcement is successful. Its application, enforcement and the 
monitoring of the rules often differ vastly from the theory. Institutional barriers to 
accountability are still visible in Brazil and give opportunities for illicit behaviour (Mota 
Prado, Carson, and Correa 2015). The U.S. Department of Commerce (2016a) 
asserts that even though, “Brazil has laws, regulations and penalties to combat 
corruption, […] their effectiveness is inconsistent”. The weak accountability structure 
let corruption flourish: “The chances that corrupt activity will be detected at all are in 
fact quite low, while the chances that detection will then lead to effective punishment 
are infinitesimally small” (Taylor 2010, 93). Furthermore, the level of enforcement of 
anti-bribery law and the quality of accountability differs among the individual states 
(U.S. Department of Commerce 2016a).  
A principal reason for the low accountability is the prevailing corruption within the 
judiciary. Half of the population see the judiciary as extremely corrupt (Transparency 
International 2013). Many Brazilians even say it is the most corrupt branch of the 
government (Green 2012, 45). The existence of corruption in the judiciary was 
proven in 2003 during the investigation, “Operation Anaconda”. This exposed a 
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corrupt ring involving various federal judges, police men and other agents (Green 
2012, 45). However, the judicial independence, virtual immunity from prosecution and 
collegiality made it difficult to remove corrupt judges from the court (Taylor 2010). 
The police were also confronted with allegations of corruption inside the force which 
was participating in investigation processes. The low salary of the police is seen as a 
main reason for their lack in resilience regarding bribe payments (Otten 2006). 70% 
of Brazilians perceive the police as highly corrupt (Transparency International 2013). 
The public regard the police as one of the most corrupt branches of the civil servants 
and it is assumed that in return for bribes they hinder prosecution of corrupt 
investigators or companies (Salgado 2002). 
Another influential reason for the weak judiciary is the difficulty and lack of monitoring 
and accountability due to the prevailing institutional arrangements (Taylor 2010). The 
absence of a well-functioning government and weak courts and law enforcement 
allowed corruption to flourish (Green 2012). There are various organisations 
participating in the whole process reaching from accusations to investigations and 
prosecutions. However, there is no clear interaction or permanent link facilitating 
cooperation in information gathering and sharing (Taylor and Buranelli 2007). The 
multiplicity of organisation may hinder or complicate the investigatory process which 
is in favour off the corrupt as they are more likely to escape prosecution. 
The lack of cooperation and coordination and the mere focus on investigation instead 
of achieving oversight or effective sanctioning, weakens the judiciary (Taylor 2010). 
The lack of a central authority to oversee the processes complicates imposing 
sanctions (Taylor and Buranelli 2007). In the case of existing monitoring and 
oversight processes they are often slow and uncertain (ibid.). This is likely to be 
advantageous for corruption because it decreases the probability of detection. 
Despite the duplication of functions and lack of oversight, institutional multiplicity can 
also be seen as complementary. Some argue that multiplicity leads to a greater 
chance of corrupt acts being identified because various institutions work on the same 
case. Multiplicity has especially enhanced the accountability process by, “allowing 
institutions to compete, to collaborate, to complement one another, or to compensate 
for one another’s deficiencies or oversights” (Mota Prado, Carson, and Correa 2015, 
111).  
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In spite of these possible advantages, most researchers agree that institutional 
multiplicity leads to a myriad of shortcomings. Communication between the 
institutions is rare in comparison to other countries (Mota Prado, Carson, and Correa 
2015). The multiplicity is likely to create coordination problems and the “risk of some 
actors undermining the functions performed by others” (ibid., 162). In the past, 
cooperation between the organisations mainly took place with high profile cases but 
not in regular, day-to-day investigations (ibid., 145).  
Another constraint apparent in all institutions is the relatively small size of the 
workforce commissioned with the investigation of corruption (Taylor and Buranelli 
2007, 67). The wide range of responsibilities and the large number of corruption 
cases limit investigations and prosecutions. This also affects the judicial effectiveness 
which is seen as relatively low despite its independence. Reasons for the low 
effectiveness are also the high burden, inefficiency, intimidation and further external 
influences (The Heritage Foundation 2017). Courts also face structural problems and 
are malfunctioning because they “have been burdened by an explosion in demand, 
scarce human resources, weak administration, a highly bureaucratic process, and a 
dated criminal code” (Taylor 2010, 103). Hence, judicial processes are usually 
inefficient, lengthy and unpredictable which could benefit corruption. 
Even though the incentive structure supports the detection of cases, it does not 
motivate officials to follow a successful prosecution. The main incentive for 
investigators is generally the detection of new cases (Taylor and Buranelli 2007), 
because the detection instead of the prosecution helps them reach their career goals. 
This incentive structure increases inefficiency in the investigatory process and it is 
less likely that the accused will actually be punished. Even if the corrupt get 
prosecuted, the processes usually take many years to reach a conclusion, probably 
enough time to hide the bribe payments or to destroy the evidence. Thus, 
recuperation of illicit payments is difficult (Salgado 2002).  
Another obstacle is the “heavy burden of proof necessary to establish guilt in criminal 
cases” (Mota Prado, Carson, and Correa 2015, 148). Former rules required a definite 
conviction which means there is no possibility of appeal (Taylor 2010). Without 
sufficient evidence, successful punishment was scarce. The judiciary is restrained by 
formalistic rules, rigid standards and a high evidentiary burden on prosecutors (Mota 
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Prado, Carson, and Correa 2015). These formalities undermine the work of the 
judiciary and the effective punishment of the corrupt. Even if sanctions are imposed 
they are often relatively small (Taylor and Buranelli 2007) which reduces the effect of 
deterrence. 
The structure of the institutions investigating corruption is not very effective. The 
federal police for instance is less autonomous and more dependent on government 
officials (Taylor and Buranelli 2007, 66), which might hinder their prosecution. The 
Federal Public Ministry (MPF) is “the most important institution of accountability at the 
federal level in Brazil” (ibid., 63). However, it is restricted by the large volume of 
potential cases which the individual prosecutors can select. Due to the arbitrary 
selection of cases and the slow judicial process, the MPF’s activities often do not 
show an overall coherent direction (ibid., 64). This, and the insufficient number of 
prosecutors, weakens the investigatory process (ibid.). Nevertheless, the autonomy 
given to the investigators regarding the selection of cases and the lack of 
centralisation may strengthen the MPF’s power because cases one prosecutor 
overlooks, another one could still start to investigate (Mota Prado, Carson, and 
Correa 2015, 148). But it is possible that the free selection of cases provides another 
source for corrupt behaviour as bribe payments might influence officials to drop a 
case, or select a different one. 
In terms of monitoring, the large number of municipalities and companies makes it 
difficult to overview all behaviour. Municipalities are regularly audited regarding 
corruption also in relation with the private sector. However, from over 5,000 
municipalities, only a few undergo audits each year (Mota Prado, Carson, and Correa 
2015, 138). Even though this may have some effect in the audited municipalities, it is 
unlikely to affect those which are not reviewed.  
The aforementioned inefficiencies show that the probability to detect corruption was 
relatively low. The legal reforms of the past years however, have facilitated the 
investigatory and prosecution process. They made it possible for prosecutors to 
choose between civil and criminal charges. In civil cases the amount of proof needed 
is lower and thus prosecution is likely to be easier (Mota Prado, Carson, and Correa 
2015, 148). The new “tougher judiciary” which is “backed by public outrage” is seen 
as the causes of the high level of recent corruption revelations (Haynes and 
 
 
S1908391  30 
 
Spagnuolo 2017). Without the reform, the latest investigations and allegations 
revealing large corrupt networks “might never have taken off” (Watts 2017). One 
reason might also be the newly established plea bargaining, allowing prosecutors to 
make deals with suspects. These can reduce the sentences of suspects if they 
comply, by informing investigators about other corrupt activities (ibid.). 
The Clean Company Act which was part of the reforms allows three types of 
punishment of corrupt behaviour: administrative, civil and criminal (Mota Prado, 
Carson, and Correa 2015). It further introduced corporate liability and extends civil 
and administrative liability to legal persons such as foreign and Brazilian multinational 
companies (ibid.). Being able to impose administrate liability allows institutions to 
bypass the inefficient judicial system (ibid.). However, administrative sanctions can 
be overturned and it is found that only a small share of corrupt officials (3.17%) were 
actually convicted (ibid., 151). The Clean Company Act will hold legal persons liable 
for the actions of their employees, agents and intermediaries (ibid.). It is expected 
that this will serve as an incentive of stronger controls and diligence to implement 
anti-corruption measures within the firms. 
Usually corrupt businesses only received punishment in terms of fines and temporary 
suspensions from being allowed to enter into contracts with the public sector. 
Morosini and Vaz Ferreira (2014), argue that this punishment is not a sufficient 
deterrence and does not change the status quo. Furthermore, Brazil lacks specific 
laws which prohibit illicit payments between private parties (ibid.). However, the new 
regulations are likely to impose stricter sanctions which might create higher levels of 
deterrence.  
Brazilian anti-bribery law in general, “does not provide for a minimum requirement in 
compliance programmes” (Morosini and Vaz Ferreira 2014, 149). Nevertheless, it 
cannot be ignored that those companies operating internationally or with orientation 
towards foreign markets often need to follow foreign anti-bribery laws in addition to 
the Brazilian laws. Companies registered on the U.S. stock market must be 
especially diligent to obey certain anti-bribery rules, since the law enforcement of the 
Foreign Corruption Practices Act is high.  
In summary, legal enforcement was and partly still is generally weak in Brazil. New 
developments in anti-corruption law may be more successful in fighting corrupt 
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behaviour. However, it needs to be seen whether the law enforcement will be efficient 
in diminishing corruption. Prior to 2014, the weak legal enforcement was relatively 
unsuccessful in fighting corruption and as I argue, therefore unlikely to be a sufficient 
deterrent. These findings support my argument that corruption could prevail and 
companies were more likely to benefit from the advantages of corruption.  
5. Industry Variation 
5.1. Industry selection 
Having explained possible mechanisms and inefficiencies, I now look at the industry 
variation. I expect that some variation between industries and sectors is likely. In 
order to test my previous findings, that inefficiencies may have attenuated the effect 
that corruption has on FDI, I now select three sample industries. Because all 
economic sectors face corruption (Agência Efe 2017), the pattern for selection is: 
most, medium and least corrupt. If my empirical findings are applicable and 
corruption does in fact not strongly affect FDI, the most corrupt industry should see 
similar developments in FDI as the least corrupt industry. The medium corrupt 
industry will serve as control industry. 
Industry Sector Bribery Incidence (% of firms 
 experiencing at least one  
bribe payment request) 
Manufacturing   12.0 
 Other Manufacturing 21.2 
 Garments 16.8 
 Furniture 15.8 
 Leather Products 10.6 
 Chemicals & Chemical Products 9.2 
 Textiles 7.0 
 Motor Vehicles 5.9 
 Machinery & Equipment 5.5 
 Food 3.2 
Services   11.4 
 Retail 13.0 
 Other Services 11.7 
 IT & IT Services 0.3 
Table 3: Percentage of firms which were requested to pay bribes (World Bank Group 
2009) 
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Table 3 shows the prevalence of bribery in Brazil per sector. The data demonstrates 
that bribery is more common in the manufacturing industry than in services. The 
division “other manufacturing” is the most corrupt. However, the study does not 
explain which industries are grouped into “other manufacturing”. Manufacturing is 
defined as “the making of articles on a large scale using machinery” (Oxford 
Dictionaries 2017). Therefore construction, or to some extent even mining could be 
included in this group. Other industries with high corruption are garments, furniture 
and leather product manufacturing, as well as retail. The least corrupt sectors are 
food and information technology services. 
Comparing the industries and likelihood of bribe payments of Brazil and 27 other 
large economies, the outcome is similar (table 4). Transparency International’s Bribe 
Payers Index ranks industries and countries on a scale from 0 to 10 where a 10 
means no bribery is perceived.  
Rank Sector Score 
1 Light manufacturing 7.1 
1 Agriculture 7.1 
3 Civilian aerospace 7 
3 Information technology 7 
5 Banking and finance 6.9 
5 Forestry 6.9 
7 Consumer services 6.8 
8 Telecommunications 6.7 
8 Transportation and storage 6.7 
10 Fisheries 6.6 
10 Arms, defence and military 6.6 
12 Heavy manufacturing 6.5 
13 Pharmaceutical and healthcare 6.4 
13 Power generation and transmission 6.4 
15 Mining 6.3 
16 Oil and gas 6.2 
17 Real estate, property, legal and business services 6.1 
17 Utilities 6.1 
19 Public works contracts and construction 5.3 
Table 4: Bribe Payer Index by sector, global (Transparency International 2011) 
 
The disadvantage of this index is that it only differentiates by sector or country but not 
both. Nevertheless, the index includes Brazil and other territories which in total 
represent almost 80% of global outward trade and investment (Transparency 
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International 2011). Therefore, I argue that the index is relevant for the case of Brazil 
since country specific information is scarce. 
According to the Bribe Payers Index shown in table 4, public works contracts and 
construction is the most corrupt sector, followed by utilities as well as real estate and 
legal and business services. Of all 19 industries observed oil, gas and mining are the 
fourth and fifth most corrupt sectors. The pharmaceutical industry and healthcare are 
considered seventh place on the high corruption scale. According to Transparency 
International (2011), the cleanest industries are agriculture and light manufacturing 
even though bribery can still be expected as they scored a 7.1 out of 10. 
These two data reviews raise the expectation that construction and mining, as well as 
garments and furniture are highly corrupt industries. The chemical and 
pharmaceutical industry can be found in the middle of the spectrum. On the lower 
end with less corruption is food and agriculture. In order to understand these 
industries better in terms of corruption and to see whether these perceptions could be 
true, I search for relevant corruption cases. I do not argue that corruption scandals 
and published cases give a complete view over prevailing corruption. However, 
investors principally perceive scandals so they are likely to have influenced 
investment behaviour. 
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (2017) “created a specialized unit to 
further enhance its enforcement of the FCPA,3 which prohibits companies issuing 
stock in the U.S. from bribing foreign officials for government contracts and other 
business”. In general, listings started as early as 1978 but more detailed explanations 
are only available from 1997 onwards.  
There are six bribery incidents involving business operations in Brazil which are listed 
by the Commission. The most recent one concerns Orthofix International, a medical 
device company which bribed doctors to use their products. Another medical device 
company, Biomet, was sued twice in 2012 and 2017, when its Brazil based subsidies 
made illicit payments to local doctors in order to win business. In 2016, the Brazilian 
petrochemical manufacturer Braskem was found guilty in bribing government officials 
to secure contracts. In 2012 the Eli Lilly and Company pharmaceutical corporation 
                                            
3
 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
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was found guilty of similar acts. The only company not operating in the chemical or 
pharmaceutical industry is Embraer, a global leading aircraft manufacturer from 
Brazil. Thus, this list suggests that the industries in the network around the 
pharmaceutical and chemical industry are corrupt.  
Looking at food and agriculture, the industries which are said to have low levels of 
corruption, I find that corruption exists but probably to a smaller extent. To facilitate 
the research and because food and agriculture are often intertwined, I will see both 
sectors as one group. It is important to point out that a low level of corruption does 
not necessarily equal no prevailing corruption.  
A relatively recent case of corruption from March 2017 has been found in the 
meatpacking industry (Eisenhammer 2017). Investigations were running against 
some dozens of firms regarding irregularities in the sanitary inspections (ibid.). 
However, the agriculture ministry and the police stated that the malfunction is only 
limited to few, and not all, firms operating in agriculture. The accused were mainly 
health inspectors which were bribed in order to accept the sale of rancid products 
and falsifying documents (ibid.). Allegations involve, “an alleged scheme to delay or 
cancel fines in in return for some 3 million reais ($965,000) in bribes between 2010 
and 2016” (Fonseca 2017). As a result of the investigations the ministry of agriculture 
dismissed 30 employees (Romero 2017). 
Investigations are still in progress and the dimensions of corruption cannot yet be 
foreseen. At the time of writing, only the meat sector has been investigated but no 
other parts included in agriculture. Nevertheless, as a leading exporter of life stock 
the meat industry represents an important part of Brazil’s agriculture sector. Apart 
from the aforementioned allegations I did not find any finalised or processed 
corruption case in this sector. Livestock analyst Alex Silva agrees that Brazil has 
never “seen a scandal like this in the sector” (Haynes and Spagnuolo 2017). The 
case thus adds to the belief that every sector and industry in Brazil is affected to 
some extent by corruption. 
When researching the highly corrupt industries, I did not find any corruption scandals 
or investigations for the garments and furniture industries. This does not necessarily 
mean that there is no bribery involved, but unfortunately, there is, to my knowledge, 
no data and hence little or no proof available. 
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On the other hand, the manufacturing and construction industries have been in the 
headlines over the past months and years. When explaining my empirical findings I 
have already mentioned the recent developments in the Operation Carwash (Lava 
Jato) which mainly involved the construction and mining industry. This operation and 
the resulting scandal have been labelled as the “biggest corruption scandal in the 
history of Brazil” if not the world as a whole (Watts 2017). The case evolved around 
two of Brazil’s largest companies: Odebrecht and Petrobras. The first is the largest 
construction conglomerate of the region. Odebrecht paid “more than $30m […] in 
bribes to Petrobras officials in exchange for contracts and influence” (BBC News 
2017). Petrobras is a state-run oil firm where state involvement and the prevalence of 
corruption is not surprising.  
As previously stated, Odebrecht alone paid $349 million in bribes. Petrobras’ 
corruption costs reached $2bn in 2015 (BBC News 2017). I argue that it can be 
agreed that the sectors of construction and petroleum are highly corrupt because of 
the large scale of the scandal, the high amount of money and people involved and its 
wide reach globally. It needs to be pointed out that despite Odebrecht and Petrobras 
being the largest and most prominent companies involved, there are many other 
companies affected. Other companies investigated in Lava Jato generally also work 
in the petroleum or construction industry or those sectors related to them.4  
Even though the actual level of corruption is difficult to assess, my research did, to 
the main extent, support the statistics and prove the expectations. Hence, in the 
following the petroleum and construction industries will serve to represent sectors of 
high corruption. The pharmaceutical and chemical industry will constitute a medium 
level of prevailing corruption. In the case of low corruption, I look at the food industry. 
  
                                            
4
  see for instance Meu Congresso Nacional 2017 for further information 
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5.2. Development of Foreign Direct Investment 
In the following I look at the FDI which the aforementioned industries received. If they 
correspond with my empirical findings, then the industry with the highest level of 
corruption should show either the highest or similar FDI developments as the 
industries with lower corruption prevalence.  
Figure 2: FDI distribution per industry (Banco Central Do Brasil 2017) 
When looking at the FDI of the past ten years it is noticeable that, except for the 
years 2012 and 2014, the petroleum and natural gas industry had the highest inflows 
of investment. The level of investment did fall when the investigations of Lava Jato 
started in 2014, however, they recovered to some extent in 2015 and 2016. Thus, it 
seems that the revelation of corruption did not lead to a sharp drop in investment 
inflows. The Brazilian government argues that the reduction of investment was limited 
due to a new model of control introduced for Petrobras as well as the large potential 
of Brazil in the sector (Portal Brasil 2016). There are more petroleum and gas 
reserves expected in the country and its offshore area.  
As previously described, the Lava Jato investigations focus mainly on Petrobras’ 
business operations until 2010 and revealed a high prevalence of corruption. 
Through the bribe payments and the gaining of contracts, the company increased its 
-
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profits. This is likely to have attracted global investors. On the other hand, the case of 
construction does not show a similar effect. 
The FDI of infrastructure construction, the pharmaceutical industry and agriculture 
are relatively low in comparison to the other industries. Despite accounting for 
different levels of corruption, they do show similar developments and investment 
levels. This is especially interesting because these industries experienced a similar, if 
not the same, prevailing business environment in Brazil. An important distinction is 
primarily the level of corruption. However, it does not seem to have had a large effect 
which supports my argument that corruption may not necessarily have a negative 
impact on FDI.  
When comparing the food and the chemical industry it can be noticed that they show 
similar levels of FDI. The peak of the chemical industry is even slightly higher than 
the one of the food industry. Only the fluctuations along the timeline vary. Despite the 
chemical industry having a higher level of corruption, the curves are comparable. 
This supports the hypothesis that the intensity of corruption does not necessarily lead 
to less FDI overall. 
In general, the findings lend credence to the hypothesis that the effect of corruption 
on FDI was attenuated, because industries with high and low corruption levels, both 
received similar FDI levels. In the case of Petrobras, the principal player in the 
petroleum sector, corruption is likely to have helped increase FDI. However, this 
cannot be confirmed for the other sectors. Therefore, the industry variation supports 
my hypothesis that inefficiencies and a weak enforcement of anti-corruption law 
attenuated the effect that corruption has on FDI. 
6. Conclusion 
The analysis of the inefficiencies prevailing in Brazil’s business environment and law 
enforcement showed that companies struggle with and are concerned about a variety 
of factors. Starting with lengthy processes to open up a business, barriers to enter 
the domestic market and high direct and indirect costs concerning taxation are 
hurdles when operating in Brazil. As it could be seen some factors might deter 
companies from investing into Brazil. Competition is often weak and resource 
allocation is thus not optimal from a liberalist point of view. However, I have shown 
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that inefficiencies could attenuate the effect of corruption on FDI. Thus, corruption 
does not necessarily have a negative correlation with FDI. 
All of these inefficiencies and the weak accountability and law enforcement of anti-
corruption law in the private sector were to some extent beneficial for corruption. As 
the empirical evidence showed, corruption may help circumventing the inefficiencies. 
It is also likely that bribe payments led to cost reduction which further motivated illicit 
behaviour. Hence, the evidence supports the hypothesis and corruption did not 
necessarily negatively affect FDI in Brazil. The research on industry variation 
corroborates this finding. 
Furthermore, it can be said that even though corruption may have not negatively 
affected the amount of FDI coming into Brazil, there are also other factors impacting 
FDI. Additionally to corruption, Jalil et al (2016) found that the trade openness and 
external debt positively influence FDI. The coefficient of these is even higher than the 
one of corruption. This suggests that by influencing these two variables the FDI 
inflows would increase more than in case of an increase in corruption. Other 
variables like government expenditure negatively affects FDI (Jalil, Qureshi, and 
Feridun 2016). Thus, the influence of corruption might be mitigated by the factors 
with opposing effects.   
The level, success and acceptance of corruption may also vary depending on the 
degree of which a company is domestically or foreign led. Other scholars such as 
Brada et al (2012) have suggested a distinction between the level of corruption 
prevailing in the home countries of investors and its effects on FDI. Some 
differentiate according to the type of FDI as for instance market or resource seeking 
FDI.5 However, due to the limited word count of the paper, I could not extend the 
research and apply these factors in the case of Brazil. 
A further limitation and challenge of this research is the lack of documentation or 
measurement of corruption. Because corruption is illicit, firms do not openly discuss 
why and how many bribes they paid. It is likely that the current and future corruption 
scandals will reveal more about the incentives. Furthermore, it was difficult to find 
numerical evidence for the impact of corruption because firms hide it from their 
                                            
5
 See for example Brouthers, Gao, and McNicol (2008) for a distinction between types of FDI 
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financial statements. For a detailed study on causality, more quantitative data would 
be necessary. There are also opposing views on whether corruption influences FDI 
or if in fact FDI impacts the level of corruption.6  
Since the evolvement of recent corruption scandals, in particular the Lava Jato 
scandal, perceptions regarding corruption and law enforcement have changed. 
Therefore, it may be useful for future studies to further analyse the recent changes 
and whether these had an impact on the mechanisms described in this thesis. Jalil et 
al’s (2016) analysis only uses data until the year 2012. Thus, recent changes in 
Brazilian anti-corruption law and their possible effects are not included. Since the 
changes where implemented in 2014, I believe that it is still too early to be able to 
analyse all possible effects. 
It is likely that the legal enforcement and the accountability processes have become 
more efficient in recent years, leading to higher deterrence. If this was the case, it 
would outweigh some of the advantages of corruption due to the fear of penalties and 
costs. Therefore, studies about the recent changes are needed even though they are 
probably difficult at the current state because the new policies have only recently 
been implemented. 
I would also like to point out that the aim of this thesis was only to review the relation 
between corruption and FDI inflows. I do not suggest that corruption, and thus the 
diversion of public funds for instance through tax evasion, is beneficial in general for 
an economy or society. Other effects of corruption form not part of this paper and 
were therefore not discussed. 
It can be concluded that this thesis successfully added to existing literature in 
explaining the mechanisms which may have possibly attenuated the effect that 
corruption had on FDI. Furthermore, it provided an analysis linking economic and 
political science approaches and applying them on the case of Brazil.   
                                            
6
 See for example Robertson and Watson (2004) for an analysis on how FDI may impact corruption 
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